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Abstract. The Credit Network is a model for transactions across a net-
work of agents based on bilateral trust between agents. Credit Networks
capture many aspects of traditional currencies as well as new virtual
currencies and payment mechanisms. In a credit network, if an agent
defaults, every other node that trusted it is vulnerable to loss. Alterna-
tively, in a cryptocurrency context, securing a channel requires putting
capital into escrow to guarantee against default. In this paper, we intro-
duce constraints that bound the total amount of loss that the rest of the
network can suffer if an agent (or a set of agents) were to default. We
show that these constraints preserve two important aspects of credit net-
works. The first is route independence: if there are multiple trust-paths
over which a transaction can clear, then it does not matter which one is
used. The second pertains to liquidity (i.e. the fraction of transactions
that succeed): given a symmetric transaction matrix, any achievable vec-
tor of net “credit balances” of the agents is equally likely. This technical
property allows us to extend the original analysis of liquidity in credit
networks to the constrained case. Surprisingly, aggregate borrowing con-
straints greatly simplify the analysis and achieve the optimal tradeoff
between liquidity and the number of trust-edges.
1 Introduction
Liquid currency enables practical implementation of markets. But securely stor-
ing gold is expensive, so there naturally arise banks for providing storage.
Historically, banks issued bank notes to depositors, which could be traded in
lieu of deposited gold. Modern banks let depositors write checks that fulfill that
same purpose. Some non-governmental organizations issue their own currencies,
sometimes intended for use in particular geographic regions. Prepaid gift cards
function in a similar manner, and are often used as a hard-to-track form of pay-
ment. Most MMORPGs issue their own currency, which can often be exchanged
on unofficial marketplaces for real-world currency.
However, notes issued by most entities would have no exchange value if the
entity could not honor them. As such, a bank note is only useful as a means
of exchange between individuals who trust that the notes are redeemable. In
order to send a payment, then, a payer needs to exchange her notes for notes
acceptable to the payee. Moreover, careful individuals might track the total value
of notes owned from a single issuer, reducing exposure to a single default.
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Fig. 1. A credit network.
Formally, then, consider a system in which agents u1, ..., un are willing to ac-
cept notes from banks v1, ..., vm, where individual ui is willing to accept w(ui, vj)
notes from vj . The graph in figure 1 provides a visual representation of a credit
network with 5 agents, where an arrow from agent A to agent B labeled with 5
means that w(A,B) = 5. As a real-world example, in an economically healthy
country, individuals are typically willing to accept functionally infinite numbers
of notes from the central bank, and can transact by trading these notes. The
resulting network appears star-like, with the central bank at the center.
Such a model is known as a Credit Network. In a general credit network, au-
tonomous agents can issue their own notes, and other agents can choose whether
to accept these notes as payment, i.e. they can decide whether to trust any other
agent, and for how much. Money is sent along paths of trust, and reduces the
amount of “residual trust” along the path; the transaction fails if no path ex-
ists. Trust is replenished by a transaction in the opposite direction. Ghosh et
al, [9], De Figueiredo et al,[8] and Karlan et al[12] independently formulated
this model, and Dandekar et al [6] formalized the model’s mathematics. Credit
networks have also been used in practice for applications built on existing trust
networks. Examples include P2P systems that enable trading goods across a
social network [14], Ostra [16], a system to combat email spam, and the Yootle
[19], a currency system for quantifying utility in group decision making.
More recently, credit networks are in use to improve cryptocurrency scaling
and latency. In most blockchains, all network participants must agree on a global
shared state, limiting transaction rate and causing potentially hours of latency.
Cryptocurrencies enable anonymous, trustless transactions. However, in prac-
tice, some pairs of agents will know each other and may transact repeatedly. If
these pairs trusted each other, they could transact without putting any infor-
mation on a blockchain. Instead, they could privately track the net balance of
their transactions and settle this balance only as necessary.
One innovation of the Lightning network [18] and analogous “Layer 2” net-
works on other cryptocurrencies is a way to manufacture trusted bilateral rela-
tionships. Individuals need not put every transaction on the blockchain; rather,
they need only to threaten to put their transactions on the blockchain. Such
threats are made credible if two parties put money into escrow on the blockchain,
and the net balance between the parties does not exceed the amount of money in
escrow. The result is a large network of private channels of specific “trust” capac-
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ities, where transactions can route along paths in the graph. Modulo transaction
fees and implementation details, this is almost exactly a credit network.
Fig. 2. A Lightning-style network, equivalent to the credit network in figure 1.
For example, consider the Lightning-style network in figure 2. Every undi-
rected edge has, in cryptocurrency parlance, a fixed amount of capital in escrow.
The two parties to an edge possess certificates that record how much of the
escrowed capital belongs to each party, and one party can “pay” the other by
altering this balance. No party can own more than 100% of the escrowed capital.
Thus, if A owns 5 units of the money escrowed on edge (A,B), B can accept
up to but no more than 5 units of money from A. We can model the Lightning
network, therefore, as a credit network where, in this case, w(B,A) = 5. In fact,
the set of transactions possible in Lightning-style network in figure 2 are exactly
those possible in the credit network in figure 1.
However, placing capital into escrow to secure an edge is expensive. Typi-
cally, more capital in escrow means a higher probability of transaction success
(henceforth, liquidity, i.e. the fraction of transactions which succeed, given an
exogenous transaction distribution), so agents must balance liquidity against es-
crow costs. Dandekar et al. [7] study the incentives of an agent on a fixed escrow
capital budget. Here, we show that restricting agent behavior can achieve the
optimal tradeoff between liquidity and escrowed capital.
In the classical credit network model, one agent can limit its vulnerability to
insolvency of other agents by limiting the total value of notes it possesses from a
single other agent. However, in many contexts, a lender cannot become insolvent
if it possesses as much in liquid assets as the total value of its issued notes. If
this holds, a rational agent should be willing to accept any number of these bank
notes. Analogously, in the United States, to reduce default risk, the central bank
mandates that banks possess in liquid currency a percentage of their total debt.
We study the dynamics of credit networks that have additional constraints
imposed. In particular, we study the liquidity of a network in which every node
is disallowed from borrowing more than some quantity in aggregate from its
neighbors; we call these node constraints. More generally, we study constraints
on the total amount of “net borrowing” between any set of nodes and the rest of
the network; we call these predicate constraints. In addition to being natural in
their own right, they have specific advantages in many real-life situations that
are well modeled by credit networks. We give three examples:
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1. In Lightning, aggregate node constraint would allow pairwise relationships
to be truly trust-based and not based on pairwise escrow; each node could
be subject to an aggregate node constraint, and secure their relationships
by putting just the aggregate amount in escrow. Such a system can be im-
plemented via multi-party smart contracts. As we show here, this type of
system achieves the optimal tradeoff between liquidity and escrow costs.
2. The popular app SplitWise [1] allows a group of friends to track shared ex-
penses. A process called “simplify your debts” cancels debts along cycles.
This “cycle-canceling” is an essential aspect of credit networks, and Split-
Wise can be modeled as a credit network with infinite trust capacities. We
believe that node constraints will greatly increase the robustness and useful-
ness of SplitWise, without substantially decreasing liquidity.
3. The cryptocurrency Stellar [15] uses credit networks in two different ways.
First, it allows “anchor” nodes to issue tokens representing claims on fiat
currency. Users can then issue “trustlines” declaring how much of each token
they are willing to hold. The resulting network of issued notes and lines of
trust is very close to a credit network. Note that Stellar allows token issuers
to permanently lock the issuing account. This fixes the supply of a token,
in effect implementing a node constraint. And second, Stellar implements
a Layer 2 protocol like Lightning. Greater liquidity in this network would
mean cheaper payments and forex trades.
In [6], Dandekar et al analyze the liquidity of a network for a few classes
of graphs of interest, and use computational simulations to conjecture liquidity
when analysis is intractable. Here, we show in section 3 that imposing arbitrary
node and predicate constraints preserves most of the analytically useful proper-
ties of credit networks. In particular, we show that a useful property of credit
networks, route independence, is preserved. Briefly, this means that if there are
multiple routes that can be used to clear a transaction, it makes no difference
which of these routes is used. We also show that after imposing constraints, the
liquidity analysis of credit networks remains straightforward.
In section 4, we analyze the liquidity of several natural classes of constrained
graphs, showing a tight connection between edge expansion and liquidity. We
then show that imposing node constraints not only preserves liquidity but also
simplifies network structure and achieves the optimal tradeoff between liquidity
and number of edges.
As an example, any network that extends to two agents u and v D total units
of credit has liquidity between that pair at most 1− 1/D. Note that the graph
that achieves this consists of D parallel edges between u and v, and thus the
liquidity between u and w 6= v is 0. In a d-regular graph with edge expansion
β (where edges have capacity 1 and the transaction matrix is uniform), then
the total credit available to each node is d but the best known bounds [10] give
liquidity only 1 − 2/β on average. If nodes are constrained to borrow or lend
at most β/2, then the total credit available to each node is β and the pairwise
liquidity lies between 1−1β and 1−2/β, achieving the optimal liquidity tradeoff
for every pair simultaneously.
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Finally, we remark on some applications to Lightning, particularly how this
tightened tradeoff can substantially reduce Lightning’s escrow costs, and some
open problems related to credit networks.
2 The Credit Network Model
The mathematics of credit networks were well formulated in [6]. For complete-
ness, we include a summary of the model and some key properties here.
A configuration of a Credit Network is a directed graph G = (V,E) along
with a map w((u, v)) ≥ 0 denoting the amount of v’s currency that a node u
is willing to accept from v. In this article, all credit values will be integral. For
convenience, we say that if an edge (u, v) /∈ E, then w(u, v) = 0 and vice versa.
Suppose that agents u and v are transacting only with each other, and sup-
pose u tries to send one unit of its currency to v. If w(v, u) = 0, then v is unwilling
to accept the note from u, and the transaction fails. But if w(v, u) = k > 0, then v
is willing to accept the note. Afterwards, v will be only willing to accept an addi-
tional k−1 notes from u, and thus w(v, u) decreases by 1. Conversely, v now owns
one note from u that u must honor, and thus could send w(u, v)+1 total notes to
u. Hence, w(u, v) increases by 1, and the total trust c(u, v) = w(u, v)+w(v, u) is
constant. As such, we can refer to a Credit Network as the undirected analogue
of a configuration. Note that a credit network has many configurations.
We call a transaction between neighbors as above a one-hop transaction. More
generally, multi-hop transaction of value X is a payer u, a payee v, and a path
(p0 = u, p1, ..., pt = v) from u to v. The transaction is valid if w(pi, pi+1) ≥ X
for 0 ≤ i < t, and performing the transaction means performing a one-hop
transaction of value X along every edge (pi, pi+1). This process is analogous to
performing an augmenting path update in a max-flow computation. For example,
the configuration of figure 3 is the result of routing one unit from A to E along
the route A-B-D-E, starting at the configuration in figure 1.1
Fig. 3. The credit network of figure 1, after A has routed one unit of payment to E.
1 In this paper, we assume that all nodes issue notes in the same denomination, al-
though as noted in [6], this does not materially change the results.
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2.1 Properties of Credit Networks
For use as a payment method, agents care primarily about whether money can
be sent in the current network configuration. The particular details of a config-
uration in question matter far less. This suggests the following definition:
Definition 1 (Transaction Equivalence).
Two configurations of a credit network C1 and C2 are transaction-equivalent
if for any list τ of transactions, all of transactions in τ can be successfully per-
formed in sequence if the credit network starts at C1 if and only if they can be
performed starting at C2.
This definition will be useful later, but unfortunately does not directly help
us understand the space of credit network configurations. For that purpose,
consider, for example, a cycle on n vertices where each edge has capacity 1,
and the configuration where all edges have capacity 1 in the direction towards
a vertex y and away from a vertex x. Then clearly y can route 1 unit of money
to x by two distinct routes, by routing either clockwise or counterclockwise.
After routing such a payment, all edges will be oriented either clockwise or
counterclockwise. Then, for any other vertices w and z, no matter which route
y chose, w can route exactly one unit of money to z.
In other words, the configurations where all edges are routed either clock-
wise or counterclockwise are transaction equivalent. Moreover, if in one of these
configurations, a vertex routes a payment to itself along the cycle, the network
will reach the other configuration of the pair, leading to the following definition:
Definition 2 (Cycle Equivalence (Definition 1, [6]).
Two configurations are cycle-equivalent if and only if one is reachable from
the other by routing payments along cycles.
From this definition closely follows this useful property:
Lemma 1 (Route Independence (Theorem 3, [6])). The cycle-equivalence
class that results from routing a payment from a vertex x to a vertex y starting
at some configuration C is constant no matter the choice of route.
These tools are sufficient to start to define the liquidity of a credit network.
In a broad sense, the liquidity will be defined as the chance that a random
transaction will succeed in a random configuration. However, this measurement
will depend heavily on choices of transaction and configuration distributions.
Observe that the relevant distribution on configurations is the distribution
that arises from performing transactions drawn from an exogenous transaction
distribution. Consider the Markov chain on the space of configurations where
at each step, a payer vertex x and a payee vertex y are chosen with probability
proportional to λxy ∈ R≥0, and x pays one unit of money to y if possible. The
stationary distribution thus gives the relevant configuration distribution.
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Definition 3 (Liquidity). The liquidity of a credit network between vertex x
and y is the probability that there exists a directed path from x to y of capacity at
least 1 in a configuration drawn from the stationary distribution of the induced
Markov chain.
The distribution can be complicated and depends on exact transaction rates.
However, if rates are symmetric (λxy = λyx), then the stationary distribution of
the Markov chain is uniform over all reachable cycle-equivalence classes (Theo-
rem 5, [6]). Liquidity analysis thus reduces to counting these classes.
The following definition will be useful for the rest of the discussion:
Definition 4 (Score Vector). The Score Vector of a configuration C is S(C) =
{S(C)v =
∑
u w(v, u)}v∈V . Equivalently, S(C)v is the weighted indegree of v in
C.
For convenience, we will write Sv to mean S(·)v when either the specific con-
figuration is clear from context or when we refer to a large class of configurations.
A successful transaction always decreases the score of a payer and increases
score of the payee by the same amount. When the payment is along a cycle,
then, the score vector is invariant. Hence a score vector uniquely captures a
cycle-equivalence class, and Kleitman and Winston [13] show that the number
of score vectors on a graph is equal to the number of forests of that graph (where
a forest is an acyclic subset of edges). Furthermore, Proposition 2.1 of [10] shows
that the number of cycle-equivalent states where x can pay y is equal to the
number of forests that place x and y in the same connected component. The
liquidity analysis of [10] crucially relies on this correspondence.
3 Constrained Credit Networks
3.1 Node Constraints
The credit network models transactions in a real-world trust network. However,
the model only accounts for independent bilateral relationships. But a lender
might also care about a borrower’s total outstanding debt. Conversely, one agent
might want to limit her total lending. More generally, suppose that each individ-
ual in a graph G = (V,E) wishes to limit her total lending to the other agents,
in addition to her bilateral lending limits.
Let the aggregate limit on an individual v be cv, and suppose that the network
is constrained such that in every valid configuration, ∀v Sv ≤ cv. If kv is the
score of v in the initial configuration, when no debt notes have been issued, this
constraint means v is disallowed from issuing more than cv − kv notes.
Theorem 1. Suppose that the credit network system is required to remain in
cycle-equivalent classes where ∀v, Sv ≤ cv. Then the following properties over
the set of cycle-equivalent classes satisfying these constraints are maintained:
1. Route-Independence
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2. Cycle-equivalence ⇐⇒ Transaction-equivalence (for reachable cycle-equivalent
states)
3. Symmetric transaction distribution =⇒ the stationary distribution of the
induced Markov chain on reachable configurations is uniform.
Proof. Theorem 1 follows directly from Theorem 2, to be proved later.
This theorem shows that independent restrictions on node behavior preserve
most useful properties of credit networks. The main property lost is the corre-
spondence between forests and cycle-equivalence classes. However, constraints
can provide additional structure that often more than makes up for this loss.
But first, we give a constructive proof of Theorem 1 by showing that the
individual node constraints can be modeled by a standard credit network.
Intuitively, an agent v borrowing money is akin to routing flow to v in the
graph. The maximum amount of flow that can be routed into v, then, is the
min-cut of the graph that isolates v. To prove Theorem 1, we give a gadget,
illustrated in figure 4, that separates each agent from the others with a small
min-cut while preserving the rest of the graph.
Let G′ be built from G = (V,E) by, for each vertex v ∈ V , adding a “fake”
vertex F (v) connected only to v by a new edge of capacity cv. The start-
ing configuration of the network will be the starting configuration of G, and
w(v, F (v)) = kv. When agents x and y transact, they route transactions from
F (x) to F (y). Then the score of F (v) in G′ is the score that v would have in G
if agents had used G instead of G′. Because every transaction involving a vertex
v runs through (v, F (v)), v cannot lend more than kv in total.
Fig. 4. A credit network with aggregate node constraints, implemented using gadgets
Observe that because no transactions originate from within V , in any collec-
tion of states reachable from each other, the score of every v ∈ V is constant.
As such, conditioned on the choice of the starting configuration of the credit
network, we can identify uniquely every reachable cycle-equivalent state with a
score vector over only F (V ).
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Since this network operates exactly as a vanilla credit network in which half
the vertices never perform transactions, the route-independence property and
the property that transaction-equivalence is the same as cycle-equivalence on
reachable states both hold. Additionally, a small modification of the proof of
Theorem 5 of [6] shows that the Markov chain on this credit network starting
at that start configuration is uniform over reachable score vectors.
We now show that this combinatorial preservation is maintained in a more
general, expressive notion of credit network constraint.
3.2 Group Limits and Arbitrary Predicates
Suppose that a business owner applies for a loan. When assessing default risk,
the lender would likely care about the individual’s other borrowing, as discussed
previously. However, the lender might also care about the debt of the individual’s
business partners, to ensure that the corporation as a whole is not at risk of
insolvency. In other words, one might wish to limit the total borrowing of a
group of agents, as depicted in figure 5.
Although we know of no network gadget for enforcing this property, satisfac-
tion of the property can still be checked efficiently.
Fig. 5. A credit network with an aggregate constraint on a group. Here, the group in
blue is not allowed to have its aggregate indegree, relative to vertices outside the group,
exceed 12 (in this configuration, the aggregate indegree is 10).
More generally, we can study the dynamics of a credit network with broader
lending restrictions imposed. A network designer might like to require, for ex-
ample, that agent v1 can pay agent v2 but only if it owes less than a certain
amount to v3.
In fact, even when no gadget exists, any predicate that is well-defined on
cycle-equivalence classes will preserve the properties in Theorem 1.
Definition 5 (Well-formed Predicate). A Boolean predicate P on configu-
rations of a credit network is well-formed if, given cycle equivalent configurations
c1, c2, P (c1) = P (c2).
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Note that the total amount that a group of nodes has borrowed from other
nodes is invariant within a cycle-equivalent class. Hence, restrictions on group
aggregate borrowing, as in the above example, are well-formed predicates. 2
Theorem 2. Given any Boolean combination of well-formed predicates on con-
figurations of a credit network, the following properties hold in the corresponding
constrained credit network:
1. Route Independence
2. Cycle-equivalence ⇐⇒ transaction-equivalence (for reachable cycle-equivalence
classes)
3. Symmetric transaction distribution =⇒ the stationary distribution of the
induced Markov chain on reachable cycle-equivalence classes is uniform.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4 Liquidity Analysis
As per Proposition 2.1 of [10], the liquidity between two vertices is equal to
the probability that a uniformly random forest puts the vertices in the same
connected component. Unfortunately, sampling a random forest is #P -hard [11].
As such, a succinct analytical expression for liquidity likely does not exist. A
polynomial-time approximate sampling scheme was recently found by Anari et.
al. [2], but it does not give an obvious (approximate) expression for liquidity.
However, the loss of this correspondence does not prevent tight liquidity
analysis. We show that constrained networks can achieve the same liquidity
bounds as in [10], but our bounds are on liquidity between each pair of vertices,
instead of on average, and with a much simpler proof. We also show an interesting
combinatorial difference between constrained and unconstrained networks.
In [6], Dandekar et. al. run simulations to conjecture liquidity when analysis
is intractable. If a predicate can be evaluated efficiently, then liquidity can be
experimentally estimated in a similar manner, with the caveat that the Markov
chains used in [6] lack polynomial mixing time bounds.
4.1 Trees
Prior to [2], one of the few classes of graphs that permitted exact liquidity
computation were graphs of low treewidth, as outlined in [17]. As such, after
adding constraints, it is natural to look first for an algorithms on tree-like graphs.
2 Not all “natural” predicates are strictly well-formed. For example, “A is willing to
lend $10 to B, but only if B’s debt to C is less than $5,” as it relies on states of
links that might vary within a cycle-equivalent class. Such a constraint can be made
well-formed by asking instead whether there exists a cycle-equivalent configuration
satisfying the original constraint. Informally, we conjecture that most constraints of
interest fit within this framework and are computable with max-flow computations.
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Theorem 3. In a tree with node constraints, liquidity can be computed in time
polynomial in the size of the graph and in the maximum capacity along an edge.
Theorem 4. Suppose a graph G = (V,E) with node constraints has tree-width
k, and let S = maxv
∑
u∈Γ (v) c(v, u). There exists an algorithm to compute liq-
uidity in time poly(|V |, Sk, 2k2).
Proof. See Appendices B.1 and B.2
The latter algorithm is similar to that of [17], but with an extra filtering step.
4.2 Star Graph
Most graphs do not permit clean analysis. However, the star graph, where every
edge from an external vertex vi from the central vertex u has capacity ci, has a
simple structure. How do node constraints affect liquidity in a star?
Without loss of generality, observe that the edge nodes need no extra con-
straint, as any extra constraint is equivalent to a decrease in capacity on the
associated edge. Similarly, the center vertex can be constrained to perform no
transactions whatsoever, if we add an extra outside vertex and have any trans-
actions involving the center go to this vertex, as in figure 4.
Theorem 5. When a star graph is constrained such that its central vertex has
score equal to half its (unconstrained) maximum score (rounded), the steady-
state failure probability between any two vertices i and j is at most 4/(ci + cj).
Moreover, the steady-state failure probability is at least 2/(ci + cj + 2).
Proof. See Appendix C
In an unconstrained star, the failure probability is 1/(ci + 1) + 1/(cj + 1)−
1/((ci+1)(cj+1)), so constraining the star has not significantly reduced liquidity.
4.3 Expander Graphs
Let h(G) be the edge expansion of a graph G = (V,E). Recall that the edge
expansion of a graph is minS⊂V :0<|S|≤|V |/2 ∂(S)/|S|, where ∂(S) is the weighted
count of edges leaving S. Let d(v) be the weighted degree of a vertex v.
Theorem 6. If the score of every vertex in a graph G = (V,E) is restricted
to lie between (d(v)− h(G))/2 and (d(v) + h(G))/2, then the constrained credit
network is equivalent to the star credit network H where the central node u has
a fixed score of Su = |V |bh(G)c/2 and c(vi, u) = bh(G)c.
Corollary 1. A constrained expander graph has, for every pair of vertices, liq-
uidity between 1− 1/(bh(G)c+ 1) and 1− 2/bh(G)c.
Proof. See Appendix D
For comparison, [10] shows that the average liquidity is at least 1− 2/h(G),
but the proof requires several pages of analysis. What is surprising here is that
the edges in a graph can form complicated patterns, but for liquidity, these
details do not matter. h(G) is rounded because edge capacities are integral.
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4.4 Monotonicity
The authors of [10] are concerned with a “monotonicity conjecture,” which states
that the addition of an edge to a graph should only increase liquidity. They
show that this conjecture is equivalent to the well-studied negative correlation
conjecture in matroid theory; for more on the conjecture, see [20] and [5].
We give here an analysis of liquidity when every vertex of a graph gets a
constraint, and moreover, the liquidity bound holds per pair of vertices. [10],
by contrast, gives only average bounds on liquidity, but their analysis holds
for any subgraph. An analogous result would be an analysis of the liquidity
in a network with some subgraph replaced by a constrained star. Clearly, if
there exists some pair of vertices in subgraph of expansion β with pairwise
liquidity more than 1− 1/β, then this replacement must decrease their pairwise
liquidity. But we conjecture that liquidity is only reduced between pairs with
unconstrained liquidity above 1− 2/β.
Conjecture 1. Let G = (V,E) be a credit network, let S ⊂ V with subgraph
expansion hS(G), and let H be the credit network formed by replacing S in V
with a constrained star, as in Theorem 5. Then for all u, v ∈ V , the liquidity
between u and v in H is at least the minimum of the liquidity between u and v
in G and the liquidity across the star (1− 2/hS(G)).
Alternatively, one could generalize the monotonicity conjecture of [10] to
constrained credit networks. Particularly, one might hope that the addition of
an edge in a network containing constrained stars will not decrease the liquidity
between any two points. However, this notion is false.
Consider the star graph G with four endpoints v1, v2, v3, v4 and center u,
where the capacity of each edge is 1 and the score of u is constrained to be 2.
Then the liquidity between any two endpoints is 1/3. Now let H be formed by
adding n parallel edges between v3 and v4. But now the liquidity between v1
and v2 is (n+ 2)/(4n+ 6), which is decreasing in n and always less than 1/3. So
the direct analogue of the monotonicity conjecture must be false. However, the
analysis of Theorem 5 implies that the liquidity between v1 and v2 is at least
1/4, and for all n ≥ 0, (n+ 2)/(4n+ 6) > 1/4 - so Conjecture 1 is still satisfied.
Graph-like objects that disobey a monotonicity-like conjecture, especially
simple examples, are quite rare. The authors would like to understand why the
similar-looking constrained and unconstrained star graphs behave so differently.
5 Applications and Future Work
Cryptocurrency innovations like the Lightning network on Bitcoin rely on a net-
work of bilateral payment channels that behaves very much like a credit network.
However, a small group of central nodes, perhaps ones that transact frequently
and can guarantee low downtime, could convert to a multiparty contract (as
implemented in, for example, [4]) Assuming Conjecture 1, such a group could
reduce escrow costs without losing liquidity.
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For simplicity of example, suppose that every agent has $D to invest into D
edges, each with capacity 2 (so each agent is initially responsible for D units of
escrow). Let the expansion of the resulting graph G be h(G).
Two agents transacting only with each other could at best get liquidity 1−
1/2D (and liquidity 0 with all others). Using a standard Lightning system, agents
only get on average pairwise liquidity 1− 2/h(G). By switching to a multiparty
contract, every pair of agents can achieve liquidity 1−2/D, - the asymptotically
optimal tradeoff. The exact savings will vary by graph, but h(G) can be much
smaller than D.
Multiparty systems also simplify payment routing. In a high traffic system,
like a group of centrally located nodes, the validity of a proposed route can be
hard to predict, especially when channel capacities are low and channel state
information is stale. Of course, the details of any routing failure analysis will
depend on the details of the routing algorithm. But routing across a multiparty
contract is trivial, and routes will be valid unless the sender is bankrupt.
5.1 Future Work
Section 3 shows that adding constraints preserves most useful properties of credit
networks. However, it does eliminate the correspondence between the forests and
score vectors. Unfortunately, the bijection in [13] is algorithmic and, other than
in tree-like graphs, an analysis of the constrained credit network using forests is
not obvious. We leave this as an area of future research.
In section 5, the escrow savings require assumptions on the transaction dis-
tribution and might disappear if Conjecture 1 were false. We leave as future
work an experimental analysis of real-world Lightning networks, particularly
with regard to the tradeoff between subgraph expansion, escrow savings, and
implementation concerns. We would also like to understand how more realistic
distribution assumptions would affect our results.
In [7], Dandekar et al consider the strategic formation of credit networks un-
der a model of balancing liquidity against exposure to defaulting trade partners.
Constraints allow for many interesting scenarios in which to study the behavior
of rational agents. For example, a node constraint is equivalently a guarantee
that one will not borrow more than a total amount. In some contexts, guar-
antees like this on nodes or groups could lead to larger bilateral lines of credit.
Understanding the incentives at play could improve designs of credit network-like
systems.
6 Conclusion
The credit network is a model for transactions across a network of agents. Ini-
tially studied in contexts related to social networks, the model forms a close
abstraction of modern cryptocurrency “Layer 2” protocols like Lightning. How-
ever, the credit network is limited in its ability to describe agent behavior. We
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study the effects of constraining the behavior of agents in a credit network be-
yond the implicit constraints in a credit network. In particular, these constraints
preserve the combinatorial structure of credit networks. Aggregate node-based
borrowing constraints transform complicated graphs into simple stars, showing
that the details of graph structure ultimately are of little significance. These con-
straints also enable modeling of more interesting node behavior, and moreover,
the reduction from complex graphs to star graphs achieves the optimal tradeoff
between liquidity and escrow costs in a Lightning-style network.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First, note that a well-formed predicate cannot distinguish representa-
tives of a cycle-equivalent class, so the cycle-equivalence relation retains a well-
defined structure. We also note that Boolean combinations of well-defined pred-
icates are well-defined predicates.
1. Without the predicate, given two feasible routes p1 and p2 from x to y
and some configuration c, p1(c) is cycle-equivalent to p2(c). As a predicate
can only declare that certain cycle-equivalence classes are valid or invalid,
and thus not comment on the intermediate routing computation steps, its
evaluation must only depend on the resulting cycle-equivalent state. Hence,
the choice of route does not affect the result.
2. Suppose c1 and c2 are cycle-equivalent configurations. Then given that a well-
formed predicate cannot distinguish cycle-equivalent states, a predicate can
only invalidate a transaction on c1 if and only if it invalidates the transaction
on c2. Hence, cycle-equivalence implies transaction-equivalence.
Conversely, let C be a set of cycle-equivalence classes that are all reachable
from each other given a well-formed predicate, and let c1 and c2 be distinct
cycle-equivalence classes. Then there is a sequence of transactions τ that
takes c1 to c2. Observe that τ must decrease the score of at least one vertex,
and the score of any vertex is bounded below by 0. Then there exists a k such
that τk(c1) is a valid transaction but τ
k+1(c1) is not. But τ
k+1(c1) = τ
k(c2).
Hence c1 and c2 are not transaction-equivalent.
Without the reachability requirement, a predicate could, for example, inval-
idate all transactions. Then non cycle-equivalent states would be vacuously
transaction-equivalent.
3. The same argument used in Theorem 5 of [6] holds here. For completeness,
we include the proof.
Let τij be the transactions taking Ci to Cj , and let P (Ci, Cj) =
∑
(s,t)∈τij λst.
This generates a symmetric matrix where the sum of all the entries in each
row and column is a constant, so this matrix normalized is a symmetric
stochastic transition matrix. In fact, this matrix is the transition matrix of
the Markov chain used to define liquidity. Since this transition matrix is a
stochastic symmetric matrix, the uniform distribution is stationary.
Note that a Markov chain on a set of states reachable from each other is
by definition irreducible. Since transactions are invertible, there are no sink
states. And we can always make the chain aperiodic by adding a 1/2 prob-
ability of staying in place. Hence, the Markov chain is ergodic.
We note that it is important for the proof of (2) that we look only at cycle-
equivalence classes reachable from each other. Suppose that one predicate eval-
uates to 1 only on a small number of isolated configurations. Then in every valid
state, no transaction is viable, so all states are transaction-equivalent.
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B Algorithms for Computing Liquidity in Trees
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider the following dynamic programming algorithm for computing the liq-
uidity between two vertices in a tree where nodes have aggregate constraints.
Pick some vertex r to be the root of the tree. Let p(v) denote the parent of
v, and qi(v) the ith child of v. Let d(v) be the number of children of v.
Let C(v, k) be the number of configurations in the subtree (satisfying all
subtree constraints) rooted at v such that w(p(v), v)) = k. It suffices to show
how to compute C(v, ·) given access to C(qi(v), ·) (if qi(v) is a leaf vertex, we
say C(qi(v), ·) = 1).
Let Di(v, k) be the number of configurations of the subtree consisting of v
and the first i child subtrees such that the score of v is k. Then Di+1(v, k) =∑c(v,qi+1(v))
j=0 Di(v, k − j) ∗ C(qi+1(v), j), and let D0(·, ·) = 1).
Let Xv be the set of scores of v that are considered valid by the constraints.
Then C(v, k) =
∑
i∈Xv Dd(v)(v, i − (c(p(v), v) − k)), where Dd(v) is 0 if not
defined otherwise above.
Finally, the total number of configurations is simply
∑
i∈Xr Dd(r)(r, i).
The above algorithm iterates over, at each vertex, all possible ways such
that that vertex has a specific score. This can be extended to also satisfy some
simple local predicates by altering this iteration to exclude particular classes of
configurations.
For example, to track liquidity, note that there is a unique path from u to v.
As the algorithm walks across the graph, it can simply throw out configurations
where an edge on this path is entirely oriented in the wrong direction.
Let H be the maximum capacity of an edge.
Storing C requires O(|E|H) entries and, given oracle access to C on the
children of a vertex v, requires computation time O(d(v)H). So running the
entire algorithm requires time polynomial in H and the size of the graph.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Let G = (V,E) be some graph of treewidth k, and let (Xi, (I, F )) be a nice tree
decomposition of G, as described in Theorem 7 of [3]. Without loss of generality,
assume that the leaf vertices have no constraints, and that non leaf vertices v
are constrained to have fixed score sv.
Iterating from the leaves to the root of the tree decomposition, the algorithm
maintains a complete list of score vectors of active vertices and a count of the
number of ways that the induced subtree can produce this score vector on the
active vertices (not including edges between active vertices) while satisfying the
node constraints of inactive vertices in the subtree.
At a leaf node, the only score vector is (0), which occurs with multiplicity 1.
At an introduce node Xi with child Xj that introduces a node v, the algo-
rithm simply adds an entry of 0 to every active score vector corresponding to the
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score of v. This maintains the induction invariant, as there are no edges between
the introduced vertex and the inactive vertices of the subtree.
At each join node with children Xi and Xj (with Xi = Xj), the algorithm
iterates over every pair of score vectors, with one from Xi and one from Xj ,
adding score vectors coordinatewise and multiplying multiplicities. The result-
ing list is then de-duplicated, with multiplicities added as necessary. Join nodes
join disjoint subtrees, so score vectors of disjoint subconfigurations add coordi-
natewise, and there is no double-counting of edges (since edges between active
vertices are not yet accounted for).
At a forget node Xi that forgets a node v (with child Xj = Xi ∪ {v}), let
Y be the edges between v and the vertices of Xi. For every active score vector
s of Xi, the algorithm computes a list of potential score vectors of Xi based on
s, by iterating over all ways of directing the edges of Y . These score vectors are
de-duplicated, and their multiplicities are set to be the multiplicity of s. The
algorithm then collates all these lists and de-duplicates them, adding multiplici-
ties when necessary. The algorithm then asks if v satisfies the constraints. If yes,
it preserves that vector, with the entry for v removed. Otherwise, it drops that
vector. The algorithm then merges duplicate score vectors, adding multiplicities
when duplicates occur.
Furthermore, since satisfaction of each vertex’s constraint is based only on
the score of an individual vertex, and once a vertex is “forgotten,” all of its
edges have been accounted for in a particular configuration c of the subtree, if
a constraint is satisfied when its vertex is forgotten, it will be satisfied in any
configuration that extends c to the entire graph.
At the final node of the tree decomposition, then, the algorithm is left with
an empty score vector and a count of the number of score vectors satisfying all
the vertex constraints.
Let I be the number of states tracked at any node. Then evaluating an
introduce node takes time O(I), a join node takes time O(I2), and a forget node
takes time O(SkI+I2). There are at most O(k|V |) nodes, so the entire algorithm
takes time O(k|V |(Sk + I2)).
Let S be the maximum (unconstrained) score of any vertex. Then the num-
ber of score vectors tracked at any one node is at most Sk. Hence, the entire
algorithm takes time O(k|V |(Sk + S2k)
This algorithm computes the number of score vectors satisfying the node
constraints. To compute liquidity from a vertex u to a vertex v, the algorithm
needs to also track connectivity patterns between vertex.
In particular, with each score vector, the algorithm also associates a directed
graph on the set of active vertices, where an edge from x to y in this graph
signifies that in subtree configuration that produces this score vector and directed
graph, there is a directed path from x to y.
Leaf nodes start with an empty connectivity graph with only a single ver-
tex. Introduce nodes add a disconnected node to the connectivity graph. Forget
nodes, when iterating over arrangements of edges between the forgotten vertex
and active nodes, compute which vertices gain new connections and update the
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graph accordingly, while dropping the forgotten vertex from the connectivity
graph unless the forgotten vertex is one of u or v. Join nodes, when pairing
subconfigurations from different subtrees, simply take the union of paired con-
nectivity graphs. This maintains the connectivity patterns throughout the com-
putation. At the end, the algorithm is left with connectivity graphs containing
only u and v, and the number of score vectors satisfying the constraints that
generate each connectivity pattern. Liquidity follows with a little arithmetic.
This increases the size of the state space at each tree-decomposition node by
at most a factor of 2(k+1)k. So the entire algorithm takes timeO(k|V |S2k22(k+1)k)).
These time complexity bounds are likely not tight.
C Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. In the unconstrained star graph, the number of configurations where
w(vi, u) = k for some vi would be constant for all feasible k. In this situa-
tion, this may not be the case, but in fact, if the score of the center vertex is half
its (unconstrained) maximum, a symmetry argument shows that the number of
cases where w(vi, u) = k and w(vi, u) = c(vi, u)− k are equal.
Let n be the number of external vertices, and let Gi be the star graph con-
sisting of only the central vertex and the first i vertices. Let the number of
configurations of Gi in which Su = k be C(Gi, k), and let Mi = (
∑i
j=1 ci)/2.
Then for any k, C(Gi+1, k) =
∑ci+1
j=0 C(Gi, k − j). Observe that if C(Gi, ·) is
maximized at Mi and symmetric about Mi, then C(Gi+1, ·) is maximized at
Mi + (ci+1/2) = Mi+1 and symmetric about Mi+1 (if Mi was rounded down,
then C(Gi,Mi) = C(Gi,Mi + 1) and C is symmetric about Mi + 1/2).
Since this symmetry and maximization in the middle holds for i = 2, induc-
tion shows this holds for i = n. Let M =
∑
i ci/2.
Now, for any two vertices vi and vj , for any configuration, let ∆k = w(vi, u)+
w(vj , u). Let H be the unconstrained graph without vertices vi and vj , let Ak
be the number of states of H such that Su = M −∆k, and let Bk = |Ak|.
Consider the one-to-many map from Ak to states of G that completes a state
in Ak to a state of G by choosing any values for w(vi, u) and w(vj , u) such that
w(vi, u) + w(vj , u) = ∆k. For ∆k ≤ (ci + cj)/2, there are ∆k + 1 choices, and
for ∆k ≥ (ci + cj)/2, there are (ci + cj) − ∆k + 1 choices. Furthermore, note
that in exactly one of these choices is vi bankrupt. Note that these maps have
well-defined inverses and the images of each Ak are disjoint.
Now, consider the case where 0 ≤ ∆k ≤ (ci + cj)/2.
Let T = (ci + cj)/2. The organization of states above enables counting the
number of state where transactions fail and number of transactions overall. As
such, the probability p of a failed transaction (conditioned on 0 ≤ ∆k ≤ T )
is therefore simply the weighted summation (
∑T
i=0Bi)/(
∑T
i=0(i + 1)Bi). By
Chebychev’s sum inequality, 1/p ≥ ((∑Bi)/(∑Bi))(1/T )(∑i(i + 1)) = (T +
2)(T+1)/2T ≥ T/2. so the probability of transaction failure is at most 2/(T ). By
a symmetricity argument, the same result holds when (ci+cj)/2 ≤ ∆k ≤ (ci+cj),
so the result holds overall.
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Conversely, the probability of transaction failure is a weighted summation
of the probability of transaction failure conditioned on a particular ∆k, and
thus must be at least the minimum of these conditional probabilities, which is
1/(T + 1).
If the score of the central vertex is constrained to be less than half its max-
imum, but close to half, then a (crude) bound on failure probability can be
obtained by decreasing (artificially for analytical purposes) some of the capaci-
ties of the edges until the score is half of the reduced maximum. The same holds
for central scores larger than half the maximum.
The above recurrence relation in effect counts the number of ways in which
to put Su indistinguishable items into n boxes of varying sizes ci. When the cis
are constant, the number of states is simply the generalized binomial coefficient.
D Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Let G be a credit network with edge expansion h(G), constrained to
ensure that for all vertices v, sv ∈ ((d(v)− h(G))/2, (d(v) + h(G))/2).
In any configuration of a credit network, it is impossible for vertex v to pay
vertex u if and only if there exists a partition of the graph into a set A and
B = V \A such that v ∈ A and u ∈ B such that all edges (a, b) between B and
A satisfy w(a, b) = c(a, b).
Let u, v ∈ V , and let A and B be any partition of V separating v and u such
that the cut prevents u from paying v (that is to say, all edges are oriented from
B into A). Without loss of generality (by symmetry of the constraints), suppose
|A| ≤ |B|.
Suppose there are x ≥ |A|h(G) edges pointing into A. Then the number of
edges contained within A is (
∑
v∈A d(v)− x)/2. Hence, the sum of the scores of
every vertex in A is
∑
v∈A d(v)+x/2. Because x ≥ h(G)|A|, the sum of scores in
A exceeds the aggregate bound implied by the individual bounds on all vertices
in A, which is a contradiction.
Hence, the only constraints that affect whether vertex u can pay vertex v are
the per-vertex constraints we imposed on top of the credit network. Particularly,
each vertex is constrained to deviate only at most h(G)/2 from a score of d(v)/2.
Let H be a star network with a new vertex u in the center, where Su is
constrained to be constant (in fact, Su = |V |h(G)/2), and let c(vi, u) = bh(G)c.
Note that for any score vector of H, adding (d(v)−h(G))/2 to each vertex’s score
gives a score vector in G satisfying the constraints on G. Then any transaction
in G is feasible if and only if the corresponding transaction is feasible in H,
and moreover, this correspondence between score vectors is maintained under
transactions.
Thus, with regards to transaction feasibility, G is equivalent to H.
We note that further constraining a vertex in G only shrinks the capacity of
the corresponding edge from that vertex to the center.
